

# **U.S. Department of Energy Consequence Management Under the National Response Framework**

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Operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the

**U.S. Department of Energy,  
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# National Response Framework (NRF)

- Guide to how the nation conducts all-hazard incident response:

## Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA)

- Describes the policies, situations, concepts, and responsibilities of the Federal Departments and Agencies activities for incidents involving release of radioactive materials.
- Identifies several categories of potential incidents and impacted entities.
- Describes how other Federal Departments and Agencies support the Department of Homeland Security when Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads a large-scale multi-agency Federal response.


# Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

- FRMAC is identified in Key Federal Radiological Resources/Assets section of the NRIA.
- FRMAC is responsible for coordinating all Federal environmental radiological monitoring, sampling, and assessment activities for the response
- FRMAC is a DOE-led interagency asset for the initial response supporting the Coordinating Agency, then transitions FRMAC leadership to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for site cleanup.

# Purpose of FRMAC

- Assist the States, Tribal and Local Governments in their mission to protect the health and well being of their citizens:
  - Provide initial prediction based on source term estimate.
  - Verify and validate release prediction based on ground monitoring data and fixed wing surveys.
  - Comprehensive characterization of environmental and public impacts based on ground monitoring, sampling and analysis, and rotary-wing survey data.

# Coordinated Radiological Emergency Response



# Federal Response

- NRIA applies whenever a Federal response is undertaken pursuant to Federal authorities.
  - Or when an incident exceeds or is anticipated to exceed State, Tribal, or Local Government resources.
- Level of Federal response is based on the ability of State, Tribal, or Local Government officials to respond to:
  - Type, amount, and custody of radioactive materials involved.
  - Extent of the impact or potential impact on the public and environment.
  - Size of affected area.

# NRRIA Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident

- Nuclear facilities
- Radioactive materials being transported
- Radioactive materials in space vehicles impacting within the United States
- Foreign, unknown, or unlicensed material
- Nuclear weapons
- Radiological dispersion device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND)

# NRRIA Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident

## Nuclear facilities:

- (1) Owned or operated by **DOD** or **DOE**.
- (2) Licensed by **NRC** or Agreement State.
- (3) Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed facilities for which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond, **EPA**.



# NRRIA Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident (continued)

## Radioactive materials being transported:

- (1) Materials shipped by or for **DOD** or **DOE**
- (2) Shipment of **NRC** or Agreement State-licensed materials
- (3) Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see **DHS/USCG** list of responsibilities for further explanation of “certain areas”)
- (4) All others, **EPA**

# **NRRIA Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident (continued)**

## **Radioactive materials in space vehicles impacting within the United States:**

- (1) Managed by NASA or DOD.
- (2) Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone, DHS/USGS.
- (3) All others, EPA.

# NRRIA Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident (continued)

## Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:

- (1) Incidents involving inadvertent import of radioactive materials, **DHS/CBP.**
- (2) Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone, **DHS/USCG.**
- (3) All others not otherwise assigned to DHS/CBP or DHS/USCG, **EPA.**

# **NRRIA Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident (continued)**

## **Nuclear weapons:**

- **DOD or DOE** (based on custody at time of incident)

## **Radiological dispersion device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND):**


- **DHS**

# DOE Consequence Management (CM) Response


- Activation may be requested based on “release or potential release of radioactive material that poses an actual or perceived hazard to public health.”
- CM will generally not be present during plume passage. The primary incident release has occurred and assistance was requested by the state after some delay.
- Exercise scenario timelines generally have the release terminated, and plume passage and deposition complete before CM would arrive.
- For some incidents, a response may be requested before a primary release has occurred. For example:
  - Nuclear Power Plant in an unstable condition
  - Other unstable situation
  - NASA launch carrying radiological material

## Approximate Readiness Time After Activation –Emergency Phase

### DOE



### State, Tribal, Local Government Response



This chart Describes the approximate timeline for DOE's establishment and management of the FRMAC in the emergency phase

# NASA Launch Scenario

- Unique situation where you know the time of a potential release.
- Even with very low risk you have a potential for release.
- Advance Launch Support Group (ALSG) is a CM contingency response group in place before launch.
- All the major elements of a CM response are pre-staged with the addition of a pre-plume strategy.
- Contingency groups have supported all NASA launches with major Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, Mars Missions and Pluto New Horizons).



# Delta V and New Horizons


- Pluto New Horizons  
Launched January 19, 2006
- Same launch vehicle for Mars  
Science Laboratory (MSL)





# Mars Science Laboratory








# Three Incident Scenarios

- Launch Area Accident T-0 thru T+40 seconds. Includes accident during field deployment prior to launch (i.e., after Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator [MMRTG] installation).
- Orbital Reentry (hours to days after launch).
- Offshore accident, i.e., at T+50 seconds.

# Cape Canaveral




# Field Team Instrument and Equipment

## Onsite/Offsite Radiation Monitoring (Radmon) Teams Configuration


- ~60 personnel (field, support, command and control)
  - Onsite – approximately 6-7 teams for CCAFS/KSC monitoring
  - Offsite – approximately 10 teams/30 locations for offsite monitoring
- Instrumentation (subject to change pending discussions with state and county and development of the MSL Monitoring Plan)
  - 4-inch Hi-Volume Air Samplers / Portable Generators
  - Violinists/FIDLERs
  - Alpha Survey Meters
  - Environmental Sample Collection Tools, as required
- 15 Environmental Continuous Air Monitoring (ECAM) units at strategic locations.

# Multipath Communication Device (MPCD)



# Multipath Communication Device (MPCD)

- GUI application for data acquisition
- Transmission application (MPCD)
- Server based data capture
- Real-time viewer
- Archival system






# Multipath Communication Device (MPCD)

- Multi-Path:
  - Standalone – Mesh Networked IP RF
  - Commercial – GPRS, CDMA, GlobalStar
  - Connections – Serial, Ethernet, Bluetooth, 802.11b/g
- Multi-Platform:
  - Mobile Vehicle, Static Sensors, Aerial
  - Software Dynamic / Flexible Hardware Configuration



802.11g Data Stream











ECAM 5 14:00

(pCi-s)/m3: LOS

LOS: 170 (pCi-s)/m3

ECAM-5 Coast Guard







ECAM 5 14:15



(pCi-s)/m<sup>3</sup>: LOS


LOS: 170 (pCi-s)/m<sup>3</sup>

ECAM-5 Coast Guard











ECAM 5 14:45


(pCi-s)/m3: 163,000

SDEV: 17 %

ECAM-5 Coast Guard









T+60 min  
1:00


ECAM 5 15:00

(pCi-s)/m3: 372,000

SDEV: 8.5 %

ECAM-5 Coast Guard







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


(pCi-s)/m3: 684,000

SDEV: 6.9 %




ECAM-5 Coast Guard
















# Summary

- Plan using:
  - Safety analysis reports and release modeling
  - Lessons learned from past launches
- Employ newly developed technologies:
  - Environmental Continuous Air Monitoring System (ECAMS)
  - Electronic data communication systems
- Pre-positioning Monitoring and Assessment response teams can provide very early detection and assessment for public dose avoidance.

# Backup Reference Material









# Who's your daddy?



Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Mars Science Laboratory Project

